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Abstract
Since the end of World War II, development aid has become a permanent
fixture of U.S. foreign policy. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) has been the primary organization for implementing the
American government’s development policies. Because of this, USAID provides an
excellent lens for viewing the historical trajectory of American development aid.
USAID’s experience in Rwanda demonstrates the broad policy shifts that define this
historical trajectory. During the 1960s, modernization theory directed development
projects. In the 1970s this shifted to a needs‐based mandate, and during the 1980s
market liberalization programs defined USAID’s objectives. The rich relationship
between USAID and Rwanda exemplifies the gap existing in development aid
between ideology and practicality. Development aid’s value in determining foreign
policy has also been underappreciated by scholars, and the comprehensive review
of USAID projects provided aims to contribute to resolving these shortcomings.

iv

Introduction
Rwanda received tremendous international attention during the 1990s as a
result of its civil war and genocide. The media, politicians, and scholars highlighted
many different aspects of the genocide, including the role played by development
and foreign aid in the intensification of ethnic animosities. International relations
scholar Michael Barnett has lamented that “post‐1995 histories of Rwanda have two
defining characteristics. One, they’re written from the vantage point of the
genocide. Second, they’re written with an eye to correct what are seen as
misconceptions of the country’s history.”1 By criticizing scholars for narrowing
their understanding to one crucial event, Barnett has identified a major shortcoming
in the growing literature on Rwanda. While analysis of the genocide is necessary,
Rwanda’s history is not teleological; it does not lead only to the genocide.
By examining the history of U.S. aid to Rwanda, a discussion of Rwanda’s
history can begin without the genocide looming in the foreground. By focusing on
USAID’s role from 1962 through the 1980s, the shifts in foreign aid can be identified
as moving from modernization practices to addressing basic human needs and
ending with market reform policies. This approach reveals on the one hand the
general ideological movement of U.S. foreign aid policy, but it can also be seen that
Rwanda programs reflected the local realities of implementing aid and did not
simply toe the Washington line. As Rwanda was remote and rather unimportant
strategically, aid managers had some latitude for creative programming specific to
Rwandan needs. The effects of this distance can most clearly be recognized in the
1
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programs of the 1980s when old programming policies addressing basic human
needs lingered in Rwanda after the ideological winds had changed in Washington.
This thesis focuses on United States’ involvement in Rwandan development
and examines what changes affected USAID’s position and objectives during the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Although the emergence of development assistance is
quite recent, aid has already become a permanent fixture in foreign policy programs
across the globe. As countries like the United States continue to fund aid projects it
is important to understand their origins, influences and recipients. By analyzing
past projects, scholars are able to determine if aid has been effective and make
recommendations about worthwhile assistance. Finally, conclusions on the value of
aid will lead to educated policy recommendations to improve assistance programs
of the future. Anthropologist James Ferguson critically explains the importance of
development as a central value of our time saying “wars are fought and coups are
launched in its name. Entire systems of government and philosophy are evaluated
according to their ability to promote it.”2 Beyond studying the role of aid in donor
countries, the history of development assistance also illuminates changes in
recipient countries. Many countries, including Rwanda, are still recently
independent and recognizing the role Western nations played since colonialism is
crucial in understanding how these nations function today.
Three sub‐questions will be considered to help examine the role USAID
played in Rwanda’s development. First, what were the specific projects undertaken
by USAID in Rwanda during these decades? Second, how did the goals and
2
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characteristics of these projects change over time? Lastly, did events in Rwanda
lead to changes in USAID projects or were changes driven by developments in U.S.
foreign policy? Research on Rwandan history, U.S. policy, and the USAID archives
reveal major economic, political, and social events globally and within both
countries that influenced USAID’s evolving objectives in each decade.
During the 1960s, President Kennedy created USAID in accordance with his
mission to promote development as a means of winning Cold War allies.
Modernization theorists believed that lesser developed regions could be more
susceptible to communism,3 providing the U.S. reason to supply aid to third world
countries. Another motivation for supplying aid to the developing world was
humanitarian, such as responses to natural disasters and famine. Kennedy worked
to distance aid programs from U.S. diplomacy, as he saw Eisenhower’s past
programs as shortsighted and too narrowly focused on strategic purposes.
Kennedy’s work combining the acquisition of allies and focusing on humanitarian
development projects, including education and health, allowed USAID to move away
from development missions of the past.
At the same time, Rwanda followed the tide sweeping across Africa and
declared independence from Belgium. Beginning in the late 1950s, African nations
rejected their colonial ties and declared independence. The majority of African
countries gained independence during the 1960s. Both the creation of USAID and

3

Works on modernization theory include: W.W Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A
NonCommunist Manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Nils Gilman, Mandarins
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Rwandan independence set up the long‐standing development relationship between
the United States and Rwanda. This also set in place the trajectory of U.S. foreign aid
beginning with modernization practices.
Two key events distinguished aid policy in the 1970s from that of the 1960s.
In 1973 the United States Congress enacted the New Directions Mandate to refocus
foreign aid on the poorest of the poor. New internal pressures within America,
including lobbies originating from the civil rights movement and the end of the
Vietnam War, forced Congress to rethink and refocus foreign aid. This
Congressional mandate occurred the same year that a military coup made Juvenal
Habyarimana Rwanda’s president. Habyarimana replaced Grégoire Kayibanda, the
president since Rwanda gained independence. These two changes expanded the
established relationship of foreign assistance between the United States and
Rwanda and shifted U.S. foreign policy objectives from modernization to a needs
mandate.
Finally, during the 1980s, the U.S. witnessed a political shift to the right with
the election of President Ronald Reagan and another shift in the trajectory of U.S.
foreign aid from the 1970s needs mandate to a liberalization focus. With a
Republican in office, the U.S. put a new emphasis on free market forces. This focus
on economic reform programs, specifically market liberalization, worked to
complement President Reagan’s platform of increased security and targeting lesser‐
developed regions to boost stability and democracy. Though programs in the 1960s
worked to establish basic economic polices for the newly independent nations, the
projects of the 1980s reflected an understanding based on a different ideology of the
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specific economic needs of individual countries. Modernization practices of the
1960s involved state direction while 1980s liberalization stressed state retraction.
These new programs worked on privatization and diversification of products. Even
though Reagan shifted USAID’s emphasis in Rwanda to market reform, Rwanda’s
economy began rapidly declining and eventually collapsed. The global economic
downturn along with internal problems during the 1980s led to a decline in prices
for Rwanda’s top commodities and severely damaged the country’s economy. The
tumbling market for coffee and tea, Rwanda’s major exports, and disastrous weather
conditions destroyed these cash crops.
Through an examination of USAID documents, it becomes clear that ideology
sets the decades apart along with major economic, political, and social events that
shifted USAID’s development objectives in Rwanda during each of the three decades
studied. The “development concept can be located in historical conjunctures and
can be understood in relation to intellectual trends, shifts in global economic
structures, political exigencies, and institutional dynamics.”4 Analyzing the full
range of USAID’s work in Rwanda is beyond the scope of this thesis. But, the USAID
documents that comprise the primary source base for this research – including
interviews with USAID employees, and regular reports such as budget submissions,
country development strategies, action plans, project updates and special
evaluations available at USAID’s online archive, the Development Experience
Clearinghouse (DEC) – do reveal the motivations and influences behind the
organization’s work in Rwanda. It is these influences, and not the project’s results,
4
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that are the primary focus of this thesis. Supporting materials include works on the
United States foreign policy, Rwandan history, and the history of development aid.
Along with an examination of USAID’s work in Rwanda, an overview of the
historiography of development aid is needed to understand the historical
interpretations of aid since the 1960s.

As more countries include development aid permanently in their foreign aid
policy portfolios, the history of development becomes more pertinent. The history
of international development is still an emerging topic, and while political scientists
and economists have long written analyses of aid, historical works are still relatively
few. Scholars from different fields generally agree that aid is the
voluntary transfer of public resources from one government to another
government, international organization, or non‐governmental organization
(including not‐for‐profit organizations working on specific issues, public
interest organizations, churches and their associated organizations,
universities, foundations, even private, for‐profit business enterprises) to
improve the lives and livelihoods in the country receiving the aid, among
other goals.5
USAID has commissioned historical reviews for its own internal purposes, but the
organization has attracted the attention of few other historians.
Historical literature on development aid has largely emerged only in the last
two decades. One historical examination of foreign aid can be found in the 2003
special issue of Contemporary European History dedicated to Europe’s “first
development decade” during the 1960s. The issue includes historical case studies
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on the aid portfolios of the United Kingdom, France, Norway, and the Netherlands.
These articles expand the historiography of official aid programs and provide a
complementary view to the origins of the United States’ development program.
According to Heide‐Irene Schmidt and Helge Pharo, “historical analysis may help to
uncover the continuities and discontinuities in the evolution and implementation of
development strategies.”6 This case study of USAID in Rwanda similarly focuses on
continuities and discontinuities in aid type and implementation over three decades.
Examining the factors and influences that created and shaped other governments’
aid programs elucidate the unique and specific events that led to the formation and
development of the United States’ aid program. For the U.S., domestic and
international factors determined the type of aid provided, distinguishing them from
other donor nations.
Modernization has attracted particular historical attention. Nils Gilman’s
Mandarins of the Future examines the intellectual history of modernization theory,
including W. W. Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth. Gilman argues that while
the theory focused on the plight of the third world, it also looked at the unfolding
sentiments in America about the condition of modernity at home. Gilman
contextualized modernization theory while examining “the image of postcoloniality
that undergirded the theory,” and compared works by modernization theorists that
debated the definition of modernity.7 Gilman’s works is important in identifying
contributors to the creation of America’s development policies. Michael Latham’s

6 Heide‐Irene Schmidt and Helge Pharo, “Introduction,” Contemporary European History 12
(2003), 393‐394.
7 Gilman, 4.
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Modernization as Ideology argues that modernization “was also a means of
understanding the process of global change and identifying ways the U.S. could
accelerate, channel, and direct [development].”8 By examining the ideological
background and effects of modernization theory, Latham’s work opens new areas
for inquiry about national identity, specifically American identity, and the impact of
the Cold War on foreign policies. 9
David Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission describes how U.S. “perceptions
motivated and then shaped actual modernization policy and activity.”10 Focusing on
projects implemented in Asia, Ekbladh argues that “understanding how
development was brought to bear in the international arena by the U.S.” allows for
“indispensable insight into the history of a powerful international theme and
provides critical perspective on how it relates to the world today.”11 Ekbladh was
particularly concerned with how modernization fit into the wider sense of America’s
development mission. Ekbladh’s work provides useful background information and
supports the argument that there were many factors that influenced U.S.
development policy. And though Nick Cullather’s The Hungry World began as a

8
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Other works consider development outside the U.S. policy framework. Amy Staples’ The
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study on food and agriculture, specifically the 1960s Green Revolution,12 it grew
into an examination of U.S. development, such as nation building, humanitarian
relief, and foreign aid that also adds much to the discussion of U.S. development aid.
There is also a wide range of works by economists and political scientists on
the topic of development aid. One of the leading development theorists on the
history of America’s aid program is Carol Lancaster, the Dean and Professor of
Politics in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She has written
extensively on U.S. aid, using her background in the State Department and USAID to
help explain past development policies and make recommendations for the future.13
According to Lancaster, “books that come out regularly about aid rarely look at U.S.
aid,” making her extensive list of contributions invaluable to the field of both
developmental history and history of U.S. foreign aid.14
Another scholar contributing to the historiography of U.S. aid is Samuel Hale
Butterfield, a development officer from 1958 to 1980, who later taught theory and
practice of international development. His work, U.S. Development Aid, an Historic
First, is an extensive look at the achievements and failures of U.S. aid in the
twentieth century and serves as a continuation of U.S. Development Assistance Policy,
a 1996 book by Vernon Ruttan, an agricultural economist who worked with USAID
12 According to Cullather, the Green Revolution was the wave of development activity that
peaked in the 1950s and 1960s.
13 Works on foreign aid by Carol Lancaster include Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little
Done, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance
in the TwentyFirst Century, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000; Organizing
U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the TwentyFirst Century, with Ann Van Duson,
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2005; Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007; George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos?
Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2008; “Redesigning Foreign Aid,” Foreign Affairs 79
(2000), 74‐88.
14 Lancaster, Transforming Foreign Aid, vii.
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and taught international development. Butterfield and Ruttan provide models for
examining America’s foreign aid history in specific cases, such as Rwanda.
While there are some worthwhile general studies of U.S. foreign assistance,
the historical literature lacks specific cases studies. Anthropologists have therefore
influenced our understanding of the local effects of development. James Ferguson’s
work is a prime example, as he chose to place his study in Lesotho, taking his
primary focus as the development apparatus. He argues that development
institutions create their own form of discourse, constructing countries “as a
particular kind of object of knowledge and a structure of knowledge around that
object.”15 These arguments, by Ferguson and other anthropologists contribute to
the study of development: its history, purpose and scholarship.
There are no works by historians on USAID’s history in Rwanda, though the
United States has a long relationship of providing assistance to the country. The
most pertinent volume comes from Peter Uvin, a political scientist and author of
Aiding Violence. Uvin’s work is very useful in examining development aid’s impact
on the Rwandan genocide, but does not focus on one specific donor and relies
primarily on evidence from the 1980s. A work focusing solely on USAID in Rwanda
spanning all three decades from independence to the civil war is lacking. The aim of
this thesis is to fill that gap and contribute to the growing body of work on both
USAID history and development aid in Rwanda.

15
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This thesis has three main chapters. The first examines the major events in
America and Rwanda in the 1960s that affected USAID objectives, especially
Rwanda’s declaration of independence, the creation of USAID in the United States
and the establishment of development assistance between the two countries. The
second chapter examines the 1970s, which began in Rwanda with a military coup
that put Juvenal Habyarimana in power and witnessed the New Directions Mandate
in the United States reorienting aid toward poverty alleviation and away from
modernization and growth. Finally, in the 1980s, the focus of chapter three, the
shifts that impacted USAID in Rwanda the decade before violence broke out are
examined. These shifts include declining economic conditions in Rwanda that led to
an economic collapse and the election of President Reagan in the U.S., which
resulted in new market‐friendly aid policies. The conclusion briefly considers
Rwanda during the 1990s, especially the impact of the 1990 civil war and the end of
the Cold War. It continues on to provide a more complete picture of how USAID
continued to evolve in Rwanda.
These chapters support the argument that economic, social and political
shifts in the United States and Rwanda affected the type of aid implemented in
Rwanda from 1962 through the 1980s. Examining Rwanda’s development history
without highlighting the 1994 genocide contributes to the deficient body of
literature without a determinist perspective leading to genocide. Because Rwanda
has been used both as a symbol of Western success and failure, as model of
development and a warning sign, a reinterpretation of Rwanda’s history is needed
to understand the importance of development aid and the impact of USAID.

Chapter 1: The Decade of Development
Rwanda, bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania,
and Burundi in Central East Africa, is slightly smaller than the state of Maryland, but
its 2011 population of over 11 million makes it the most densely populated African
nation. There are three main ethnic groups that comprise Rwanda but relations
among the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa have not always been clearly defined.
Anthropologist Johan Pottier explained that “for the period up to 1860, it was
correct to say that historians knew next to nothing about how the terms ‘Twa,’
‘Hutu,’ and ‘Tutsi’ were used in social discourse.”1 The terms have been explained as
alternately racial, cultural, economic, and social designations. During the
reconstruction of Rwanda after the genocide, all citizens were to be referred to as
“Rwandan” to help overcome the violence and discrimination of the past. While this
change may help for the future, it does not help clarify the past. There have been
many debates between scholars on the origins and distinctions of these groups.
Revisiting these debates from pre‐independent Rwanda can clarify development
objectives during the 1960s.
It is widely accepted that Tutsis migrated to the region of Rwanda
supposedly while fleeing drought and famine in Ethiopia in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. The Tutsis were pastoralist; owning cattle, a coveted resource,
made them economically superior to the existing groups in Rwanda, including the
agriculturalist Hutus, who had migrated to fertile Rwanda from Central Africa

1

Johan Pottier, ReImagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late
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during the wider Bantu migrations between the fifth and eleventh centuries. Both
groups intruded upon the original inhabitants of the area, the Twa. This small
group, comprising approximately one percent of Rwanda’s population today, were
generally artisans and hunters.2
While most scholars accept this timeline, it remains uncertain when the
different groups entered the region. Historian Jan Vansina explained, “there never
were [definitive] successive immigrations of Twa foragers, Hutu farmers, and Tutsi
herders… [T]he settlement history of Rwanda is actually very ancient and quite
complex.”3 Regardless of origin, these three groups had integrated almost
completely by the time European explorers entered the region. For centuries “they
spoke the same language, believed in the same god, shared the same culture,
belonged to joint clans, and lived side by side throughout the country.”4 While these
three groups had largely integrated by the mid‐nineteenth century, the Abazungu,5
or white people, disrupted the equilibrium and exacerbated the preexisting tensions
of these ethnic and social groups.
The Abazungu colonialists divided and conquered Africa during the 1880s.
In Rwanda the original German colonialists – and Belgians after 1916 – comprised
no more than one percent of the population, but held all the wealth and power. The
colonial powers enforced indirect rule, making “social relationships in Rwanda
more uniform and exploitative than ever, with a clear hierarchy from Bazungu to
2 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, (West Hartford:
Kumarian Press, 1998), 14.
3 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, (Madison: the
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 198.
4 Uvin, 14.
5 The term is Kinyarwandan. Bazungu is the Swahili term for white people.
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Tutsi to Hutu to Twa.” A new hierarchy from Europeans at top to the Twa at bottom
rested on an “ideology of racial superiority.”6
As Germany’s colonial control increased, Rwanda experienced internal
conflicts. The traditional Rwandan dynasty witnessed a violent succession battle
following the death of the last leader, Mwami (King) Kigeli IV Rwabugiri. The
combined results of Germany’s presence and the internal political upheaval was a
“political structure…often described as a dual colonialism,” where Tutsi elites
worked to exploit the lower Hutu class alongside the Germans.7 While the Tutsis
were the minority group in Rwanda, for centuries they had ruled over the Hutu.
When the Tutsis migrated into Rwanda, they were established as economically
superior herders. Owning cattle elevated inhabitants financially and with this
supremacy, the Tutsis took control first at the community level then in the
monarchy. The Tutsis maintained their prominent position in the country when the
Germans arrived and after World War I when Rwanda was given to Belgium. When
the colonial powers entered Rwanda they aggravated this social division.
Eventually the social stratifications changed and in the 1930s, Belgium solidified the
shift of socio‐economic classes into different ethnicities.8
Belgium held colonial power in Rwanda until 1962. Following the Germans’
lead, Belgium initially accepted the established hierarchy in Rwanda and favored the
ruling Tutsis. As Belgians influenced the established social divisions and instituted

6
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rigid ethnic classifications, scientific tests were administered to separate the groups
and support Tutsi favoritism. These tests included measuring nose and skull sizes
and counting the number of cattle owned by individuals or families. Because Tutsis
supposedly had more Caucasian features and generally more cattle, they continued
to be the preferred group in Rwanda.
This favoritism aggravated an already tense situation as Belgians made “this
polarization the cornerstone of their colonial policy” in Rwanda.9 These tense
situations were not originally linked to the ethnic problems created by the
colonizers, but instead stemmed from the ruling class’ abuse of the struggling lower
class. The Belgians made continually more invasive changes within Rwanda,
starting with the removal of all undesirable local leaders. These undesirables
included the few Hutu leaders and Tutsis unwilling to act as puppets of the Belgian
government. From 1933 to 1934 Belgium implemented the most damaging change,
the introduction of ethnic identification cards. These cards, explained journalist
Philip Gourevitch, made “it virtually impossible for Hutus to become Tutsis, and
permitted the Belgians to perfect the administration of an apartheid system rooted
in the myth of Tutsi superiority.”10 The Catholic Church, the leading religious
organization in Rwanda, supported this new system. These changes quickly
solidified ethnic lines.
This situation lasted until a revolution in 1959 put Hutus in power over the
minority Tutsi group. African countries began to break free from their colonial
masters in the early 1950s, and within a decade almost all African nations outside of
9

Gourevitch, 54.
Gourevitch, 57.
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southern Africa were independent. Rwandan independence came on the heels of
the Hutu Revolution of 1959. As plans were being laid for independence, Hutus
revolted and overthrew the Tutsi monarchy, replacing it with a presidential
republic. Contrary to many other African independence movements, the push for
Rwandan independence involved an ethnic and social revolution that intensified
interethnic animosity.
The Hutu Revolution entailed several stages of violence. Outbreaks began as
“localized anti‐Tutsi violence and small pogroms in some provinces; hundreds were
killed, and quite a few Tutsi fled the country.”11 Along with widespread violence,
over 100,000 Tutsis fled Rwanda to neighboring countries. Catholic priests and
Belgian officials had encouraged this first stage of violence for months before it
climaxed. Following World War II, Rwanda saw an influx of Belgian Flemish Priests,
who as a minority in their home country, identified with the disenfranchised Hutu
population. Sympathizing with the Hutus, the newly arrived priests encouraged
them to fight for power.12 In tandem with this new influence, the United Nations
applied pressure on Belgium to relinquish its colonial control. These influences led
to the creation of a united Hutu front calling for radical change.
In March 1957, the second stage of revolution began when Hutu intellectuals
published the Hutu Manifesto, arguing for democracy and calling for the removal of
Tutsis from power. Philip Gourevitch described the situation, “As new Hutu parties
sprang up, rallying the masses to unite in their ‘Hutuness,’ the enthusiastic Belgians
scheduled the elections. But before any Rwandans saw a ballot box, hundreds of
11
12

Uvin, 19.
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them were killed.”13 Starting in November 1957, violence broke out regularly
between Tutsis and Hutus across the country. This violence was spurred by
Catholic priests and encouraged by retreating Belgian colonialists. The Belgians
supported the Hutu power grab partly in retaliation for Tutsis resistance to colonial
control. The United Nations also encouraged the switch to majoritarian rule as the
independence movement in Rwanda progressed.14 The colonial authorities
eventually acknowledged the social revolution occurring within Rwanda, and “the
break between the Belgian authorities and their long‐coddled Tutsi elite [came]
about only because the colonial administrators felt betrayed by their erstwhile
protégés.”15 The violence continued sporadically for decades, and became one of the
first concerns of USAID in independent Rwanda.
In January 1961, following the trend across Africa, “the Belgians convened a
meeting of Rwanda’s new Hutu leaders, at which the monarchy was officially
abolished and Rwanda was declared a republic.”16 On July 1, 1962 Rwanda became
an independent nation. This seminal event started a new journey of development
that included interactions and partnerships with USAID. Belgian colonial policy had
employed development practices and programs, but as a newly independent nation,
Rwanda was able to play a larger role in their development and promote their own
development objectives. Grégoire Kayibanda was inaugurated as President and the
new Hutu dictatorship “masqueraded as popular democracy, and Rwanda’s power
13
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struggles became an internal affair of the Hutu elite.”17 The Hutus in power
reproduced abuses that had been committed against them during the Tutsi
monarchy, while pretending to support their new system of democracy. Kayibanda
hid behind a veil of democracy with the support from Hutu elites and the West as he
continued terrorizing his opponents. Rwanda received Western support because its
proximity to Zaire, which was of critical strategic importance during the Cold War.
Ethnic violence increased and became “a central feature of Rwanda’s politics.”18 In
cross border raids, Tutsi refugees attacked the Hutu population and government,
and the Rwandan government retaliated against the Tutsis remaining in Rwanda.
This situation continued and worsened in the following decades.

The early 1960s also saw the creation of USAID. As decolonization spread
across Africa and the threat of communism expanded, U.S. support for foreign aid
grew because it “was seen as a tool to reduce discontent generated by poverty and
the consequent temptations of communism by spurring economic progress and
addressing the social and political tensions created by rapid economic change.”19
After World War II, the United States government launched economic development
and assistance programs, such as the Marshall Plan. When Eisenhower took office,
he reduced the amount of funding available to the programs started by Truman’s
administration. Eisenhower’s aid was tied to mutual security assistance, until 1957
17
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when he reversed this policy and created several development organizations and
projects.20 This move solidified development aid’s position in U.S. foreign policy. As
a senator, Kennedy criticized Eisenhower’s failure to appreciate the true importance
of foreign aid. Adding to the recent advances made by Eisenhower, the election of
President John F. Kennedy in 1960 made development aid a crucial aspect of U.S.
foreign relations.
When Kennedy took office, he declared the 1960s a “decade of development.”
During his presidential campaign, Kennedy constantly emphasized that America
would have to “demonstrate to the ‘emerging countries’ that development along
liberal, capitalist lines could alleviate poverty and raise living standards at least as
fast as revolutionary and Marxist alternatives.”21 Following through on these
campaign promises, Kennedy established the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) in 1961 by merging two existing aid agencies, the
Development Loan Fund and the International Cooperation Agency22 into a single
entity that would be semi‐autonomous within the Department of State.23 USAID was
intended to further international development and U.S. diplomacy in the newly
emerging nations of Africa and Asia. While USAID was connected to diplomatic
goals, it was kept semi‐autonomous to separate it from Eisenhower’s preference for
20
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linking aid with security interests. President Kennedy wanted to distinguish
development from diplomacy institutionally.
Beginning in the 1960s, USAID became responsible, in consultation with the
Department of State, for
the policies, country allocations, and uses of development assistance (used to
promote economic growth, education, and agricultural development, health
and family planning and democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian
assistance, and child survival) and disaster relief and recovery.24
Within the first few years USAID programs had expanded across the globe, and were
providing assistance to the inhabitants of developing countries on four continents.
By 1963, there were USAID programs in almost 30 African nations.25 During the
1960s, USAID programs were founded in modernization theory, and its primary
goals were to provide assistance in health, education and agriculture, bringing the
standards of these domains closer to those of modern nations.

USAID began working in Rwanda during its first year of independence in
1962. Foreign aid “promised to be a useful tool in promoting democracy, especially
in sub‐Saharan Africa – both as an incentive for governments to implement political
reforms and a source of financing for activities related to democratization.”26 The
United States government was concerned that newly independent countries would
turn to communist regimes, especially if requests for American aid were denied. On
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the surface, Rwanda was a prime candidate for USAID assistance, promoting its first
democratic government as the United States helped to foster growth to consolidate
strategic interests in the region. Rwanda was a tactical position between Zaire and
Tanzania, seen both as a potential ally and threat during the Cold War. To help
democracy take hold, USAID promoted sectors crucial to survival and education;
security and infrastructure (primarily in the capital, Kigali) became the donor’s first
project areas. USAID’s strategy in these first years was to “demonstrate interest in
the economic development of the country, support adoption of a fundamental fiscal
and monetary reform, and assist the Government of Rwanda in maintaining internal
security.”27 These original economic reform initiatives in Rwanda helped the new
country become established and stable without the direction of their old colonial
leader. Modernization theorists of the 1960s drove these initial programs and
policy objectives, assuming that with assistance “traditional” Rwanda could develop
in the same manner as the West. USAID documents demonstrated the goals
employed in Rwanda, specifically the importance of creating strong ties between the
new country and new organization.
USAID approached education assistance from various angles. Ambassador
Charles D. Withers presented the first foreign aid program to Rwanda as an
independence gift: scholarship funds for Rwandans to study at universities in the
United States. USAID also established regional scholarship programs for students
attending local universities. Eventually USAID also provided support for American
professors to teach at Rwandan universities and purchased necessary school
27
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equipment.28 Supervised by USAID Liaison Officer at the U.S. Embassy Gene Moore,
USAID support also included several short‐term training courses and two
undergraduate degree courses, a grant for twenty regional scholarships for students
already enrolled in Rwandan university classes, and an equipment grant to the
University in Butare. Another independence gift of thirty training grants for civil
service fields was also administered.29 From 1962 through 1968, “the United States
Government provided $20,000 for scholarships to American Universities.”30 In the
following decades USAID became more involved and provided more money for
youth education, from primary school to high school equivalency and vocational
training courses.
As Kennedy reshaped the objectives and influences of foreign assistance, the
United States moved away from influencing people primarily through military
means and started persuading them with ‘softer’ means. Rostow’s 1961
commencement address at Fort Bragg exemplified this new ideology by charging the
graduating class to fight “not merely with weapons but … in the minds of men in
villages and hills; [fight] by the spirit and policy of those who run the local
government, to intervene directly and engage themselves in the whole creative
process of modernization.”31 These USAID education projects of the 1960s
represented the needs of newly independent Rwanda and the shift from the first
stage of modernization theory to the second. As explained by Rostow, in order to
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advance from a traditional society to a society with the preconditions to take‐off, a
commitment to secular education was necessary.
Education programs worked to prevent the spread of communism, helped fill
vacant administrative positions previously filled by Belgian officials, and insured a
continued alliance with the United States. Controlling the production of knowledge,
education was the easiest way to indoctrinate people. As an effective way of
influencing political beliefs, the education projects helped ensure Rwandans would
steer clear of communism. Addressing the needs of Rwanda, USAID helped to fill
positions left by Belgians. The university and technical training provided Rwandans
with the capabilities to fill the many high level positions available in the Rwandan
government. Finally, the education projects that taught both the horrors of
communism and the skills needed to run their country also instructed Rwandans to
remain loyal to the United States. The emerging educated leaders of Rwanda were
taught to ally themselves and their country with the U.S.

USAID’s help regarding infrastructure was limited during the 1960s, and
focused primarily on Kigali, Rwanda’s capital. Small projects included furnishing
nursing schools in Kigali with transistor radios, and other small cash grants for local
commodities. In 1966, the United States increased aid levels to Rwanda and several
more programs were activated. One reason for the “increased activity was an
agreement between Rwanda and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) signed in
April 1966.”32 The agreement required the government of Rwanda to devalue the
32
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Rwandan franc in exchange for standby credit from the IMF. The increased aid from
USAID provided commodity import programs, providing trucks, vehicle equipment
and raw plastic as well as staples such as flour, oil and milk. These commodities
were sold to and benefitted importers. This food was monetized and sold to raise
funds, instead of being consumed by Rwandans. The government of Rwanda was
“assured a supply of basic commodities was available without spending its foreign
exchange, the funds financed projects planned by both governments, and consumers
were able to buy basic items.”33 When these projects were completed and deemed
successful by USAID, the allotted support amount was increased.
Beginning in late 1966 and continuing through 1968, USAID provided funds
and technical support for paving streets in Kigali and constructing a water
purification plant for the capital. These basic infrastructure projects contributed to
the second stage of modernization, encouraging the preconditions to take‐off. Along
with education, a society was thought to need to enable a degree of capital
mobilization, which would be difficult for Rwanda without infrastructure assistance
from USAID. Then at the end of 1968, USAID support was almost completely cut
from Rwanda and the number of programs was significantly reduced as “the
unpopular war in Vietnam discredited many development ideas and there was
growing distrust of the state to be the primary agent to promote development.”34
Before these funds were eliminated, USAID was able to help advise the government
on security problems.
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The infrastructure programs implemented in the 1960s worked to steady a
Rwanda that was lost without its colonial guide. As with many colonies, after
decolonization experts, leaders, and administrators left their colonial positions and
returned home to Europe. The education projects discussed earlier addressed how
USAID helped train Rwandans to fill these vacant positions. The infrastructure
programs worked with these courses to keep Rwanda progressing forward. The
construction of roads, water plants, and furnishing nursing schools and providing
commodities kept development going and allowed Rwanda to gain stability for the
future.
As discussed previously, the security situation within Rwanda was tenuous
with sporadic fighting between the government and rebel refugee Tutsis in Uganda,
Zaire, and Burundi. In July 1963 the government of Rwanda requested equipment
and construction assistance from USAID to help its internal security forces,
including both military and police forces. This initial request was denied. Then in
December 1963, Tutsi exiles launched a desperate attack from Burundi. Invading
Bugesera, a medium‐sized village in southern Rwanda, and almost reaching Kigali,
the exiles were disorganized and the government was able to beat them back to the
border. The Rwandan government “used the occasion to launch a massive wave of
repression in which an estimated 10,000 Tutsi were slaughtered between December
1963 and January 1964.”35
The rebel attack in late 1963 forced the United States to reconsider Rwanda’s
request for security assistance. Unfortunately, the U.S. apparently did not consider
35
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its role in the growing ethnic violence by providing security assistance. In the
spring of 1964, a United States police survey team arrived and after inspection
proposed appropriate and needed changes to improve Rwanda’s security situation.
While ignoring its role in the increasing ethnic violence in Rwanda, the U.S. also did
not criticize the Rwandan government for the retaliation committed against Tutsis
residing within the country. The survey team report noted that until its initial
request was denied, Rwanda was pro‐western. But “since their first request for
military and police commodity assistance had been rejected, Rwanda had become
critical and suspicious of all current efforts to assist them in the field.”36 Worried
about loosing a critically located ally, the survey team recommended the United
States provide technical and commodity assistance to keep Rwanda from possible
communist leanings. While Rwanda had grown distrustful, finally receiving the
assistance they requested apparently mitigated their fears about U.S. security
assistance.
The United States perceived there to be communist threats surrounding
Rwanda, including Tanzania. Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania,
implemented a socialist government, and fears arose that socialism would spill out
from Tanzania into Rwanda and beyond. The fear of communism spreading into
East and Central Africa led to a public safety project launched in 1964. Over five
years USAID provided $70,000 to the Rwandan government for both the military
and policy force for communication and transportation equipment, along with two
advisors providing technical training for use and maintenance of the equipment.
36
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There were also short‐term training programs that took place in the United States to
help the Rwandan government better handle the refugee and rebel situation.37
USAID documents clearly demonstrate that U.S. aid strategy focused on the
“adoption of fundamental fiscal and monetary reform, assist[ed] maintaining
internal security, and support[ed] small, viable development projects.”38 These
fiscal reform policies were geared towards helping the newly independent nation
become financially stable and productive on its own. While these projects were
underway, monetary support from the United States Congress to USAID programs
was almost completely cut, signifying concerns about money spent abroad instead
of domestically. At the end of fiscal year (FY) 1968, the Public
Safety/Communications Advisor and the USAID Liaison Officer left Rwanda and
from 1969 to 1973, USAID activities in Rwanda were limited to PL 480 Title II and
the Embassy administered Self Help Program. USAID funds for Rwanda were too
low to continue support for these aid workers as their projects were slowly
wrapped up or cancelled.
The PL 480 Title II program,39 also known as Food for Peace, received almost
three million dollars during the first seven years that USAID was active in Rwanda
and focused assistance to maternal and child health and school feeding programs.
The Catholic Relief Service distributed most of the food, which continued after
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USAID funds were cut.40 The Self Help Programs provided small amounts of funds
to Rwandans with promising development ideas. Both programs were important to
Rwanda, but the Food for Peace programs were crucial and, in fact, have continued
into the twenty‐first century.
Initially, in 1963 the U.S. Congress complained about the large amount of aid
programs in Africa, arguing that money should be directed toward problems at
home. While President Kennedy fielded Congress’ complaints and received advice
from reports recommending reductions of projects in Africa, aid programs
continued. Years later, President Johnson heeded to the requests and suggestions to
reduce aid programs and “by the early 1970s, there were only 10 operating in the
region.”41 The main reasons for the criticisms and attacks on aid programs in Africa
stemmed from misunderstandings and discontent over current events. As
development aid was still a new phenomenon, it was difficult for the American
public and Congress to recognize the successes and challenges USAID experienced.
Americans were also frustrated and disenchanted with development after the
amount of funds spent on the Vietnam War, arguing that money should now be
refocused on domestic issues. The U.S. government was disappointed with the
number of military coups taking hold in Africa, which made them question the value
of development aid and the effectiveness of their democratization programs.
Additionally, “criticisms of too extensive U.S. engagements worldwide led the
administration to close a number of its aid missions abroad (especially in sub‐

40
41

Grosz, 6.
Lancaster, Aid to Africa, 85.

29
Saharan Africa) during the second half of the 1960s.”42 All these frustrations led the
U.S. Congress to reduce the amount of money available to USAID. While USAID lost
most of its funding for projects in Rwanda, in 1973, U.S. foreign policy ideology
shifted again as events in both countries set the stage for new funding and broader
objectives.
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Chapter 2: “New Directions” for Rwanda
The 1960s began with two significant events: the creation of USAID in the
United States and Rwanda’s declaration of independence. While the relationship
between Rwanda and the U.S. was curtailed with the dramatic cuts of 1968, the
events of the 1970s recovered lost ground. As modernization theory was phased
out of U.S. practice, a new basic needs mandate rose to replace it. In the early 1970s
several events affected the relationship between America and Rwanda. During
1973, in Rwanda first, then in the United States, political actions changed the
outlook and reception of development aid. In Rwanda, Major General Juvénal
Habyarimana staged a coup, and declared himself President. Months later the U.S.
Congress, along with many other development organizations, initiated new
mandates to focus on the poorest of the poor in the world. The years following 1973
saw major increases in aid provided from USAID and a more receptive and
progressive atmosphere in Rwanda accepting this surge of assistance. Changes in
the period from the late 1960s to 1973, set the stage for new USAID programs and
projects in Rwanda.

President Grégoire Kayibanda assumed power in Rwanda after
independence in 1962 and realized the desire of many Hutus to be led by a Hutu
government. The Kayibanda regime continued the hostilities of the Hutu Revolution
and “chased or killed most former Tutsi power holders and politicians, even the
most moderate ones, as well as many opposition Hutu politicians who didn’t join
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Parmehutu.”1 While Kayibanda achieved these goals most Rwandans, both Hutus
and Tutsis, lived in fear of the government’s sporadic campaigns of violence. In
1972 ethnic violence broke out in Burundi and political disturbances left around
200,000 dead; hundreds of thousands more Hutus sought refuge in Rwanda. In
May‐June 1972, “Burundi had been ravaged by a massive massacre of Hutu carried
out by the Tutsi minority in order to keep its hold on political power.”2
Burundi has an almost identical ethnic makeup as Rwanda, but when the
Hutu Revolution took power from the Tutsis in Rwanda, the minority Tutsi group in
Burundi held onto their rule while declaring Burundian independence. As hundreds
of thousands of Burundian Hutus spilled into Rwanda in 1972, President Kayibanda
tried to exploit the situation for political gain and began to attack the Rwandan Tutsi
minority again. Over 40,000 Tutsis were victims of attacks encouraged by
Kayibanda between March 1962 and late 1964, and this sporadic violence continued
until 1972.3 President Kayibanda asked his senior army commander Major‐General
Juvénal Habyarimana to lead the 1972 attack on the Rwandan Tutsis.
Habyarimana recognized the new strains felt in Rwanda and the increased
tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis and made his grab for power. While the
overflow of refugees exacerbated existing ethnic tensions, both groups resented the
continually irregular attacks that disrupted their daily lives. Habyarimana relied on
support from his region in the north and from Rwandans persecuted and exhausted
1
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by Kayibanda’s regime. On July 5, 1973 Habyarimana took power in a bloodless
coup, starting the Second Republic as Hutus and Tutsis expressed widespread relief.
This change did not eliminate decades of ethnic hatred, but Hutus and Tutsis did
hope to lead lives uninterrupted by campaigns of violence.
Habyarimana organized a military dictatorship and offered a compromise to
the Tutsis to help stabilize the country; if they stayed out of politics they could lead
reasonably normal lives. Habyarimana’s iron fist rule created stability and
improved development prospects. However,
the main strength of Rwanda’s regimes lay not in their oppression but in
their capacity to legitimize themselves to internal and external forces. To
achieve this … a ‘development’ legitimization [was] aimed at both the
international Bazungu audience and the domestic one.4
When Habyarimana took power, Rwanda was poorer than its neighbors. This
poverty combined with Habyarimana’s skill at attracting Western development
agencies led to a surge of assistance. Development was Habyarimana’s favorite
political word, “appealing to European and American aid donors whom he milked
with great skill.”5 Western development organizations, including USAID, favored
Habyarimana because he brought an end to Kayibanda’s violent campaigns, and
made declarations of commitment to developing Rwanda that preferred Western
capitalism to communism. Conditions within Rwanda changed drastically in the
following years.
Starting in 1974, the year after Habyarimana’s coup d’état, the government
made several significant changes regarding development. One of its acts included
4
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the “pronouncement that attributed Rwanda’s 143 communes the role of ‘motor of
development.’ From now on, the communes would be the basic unit of
development.”6 This was a significant change because most previous development
projects had been centered on the capital or other large cities, instead of rural
communes. Habyarimana declared 1974 the year of agriculture and manual labor,
changed the name of the single party to Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le
Developpment (MRND) and, later, renamed the parliament the National
Development Council.7 These changes appealed to Western governments and
donors.
All these transformations turned Rwanda into what German Pastor Herbert
Keiner described as ‘ein Entwicklungsdiktatur,’ a development dictatorship. This
ideology was similar to colonial theories of “benevolent despotism, as President
Habyarimana decided to take upon his shoulders the heavy burden of the state so
his subjects could devote themselves entirely to agriculture.”8 This ideology
legitimized the government’s intrusion into all aspects of social life. Because the
Rwandan government’s development ideology focused heavily on economic
development, aid agencies abroad felt compelled to implement their projects
through the government. This arrangement allowed the Rwandan government to
funnel the majority of assistance to the groups consisting of Hutus.
While Habyarimana favored the Hutus blatantly, he did bring political
stability to Rwanda and deliver assistance to failing regions, regardless of their
6
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ethnic composition. Despite remaining desperately poor, Rwanda’s international
reputation soared,
in part because it was finally demonstrating some economic development in
a region lacking any good news. One‐party stability, the dampening of ethnic
conflict, modest economic progress invested Rwanda with a reputation for
stability and hope. Outsiders routinely touted Rwanda as a model of
efficiency and referred to it as the Switzerland of Central Africa.9
These changes helped to reinvigorate USAID assistance to Rwanda in the 1970s.

1973 also saw a significant change in U.S. foreign policy that affected
American assistance globally. The Vietnam War and the growing domestic
opposition to the war had negatively affected America’s perceptions of international
affairs. The war increased the Congress’ role in foreign economic assistance policy.
In the early 1970s, the Democratic Congress “refused to pass a foreign aid
authorization bill to protest the Nixon administration’s policies in Vietnam.”10
Continuing the Congress’ stance against using development aid for the war in
Vietnam, 1973’s the New Directions bill was passed. During the 1960s, U.S. aid was
often used to modernize societies and promote growth, but with the New Directions
Mandate, foreign aid emphasized the goal of poverty alleviation.
A group of Congressmen were able to drive their legislation through the
House of International Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees,
authorizing the New Directions Mandate. The legislation brought about “a major
reform of U.S. aid that involved policy rather than organizational change: aid was
9 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, (Ithaca: Cornell
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reoriented toward providing for the basic human needs of those in poor
countries.”11 Basic human needs included primary health care, basic education,
shelter, and agricultural assistance. These members of Congress were able to push
this mandate through because it had support throughout the government and the
development community. These groups believed it was time to refocus on
development after “its use in the war in Indochina to prop up governments.”12
Other domestic and international events also influenced this change. In
1974, the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola declared independence,
escalating Cold War tensions. Domestically, the increased number of African
Americans in politics led to a rise in support for African aid.13 These changes helped
spur increased activity and levels of aid to African nations, including Rwanda. The
increased levels of support focused on country allocations, emphasized poorer
countries, and highlighted goals to improve education, health care and rural
agricultural development.14 The New Directions Mandate, often referred to as the
Basic Human Needs mandate in popular and professional discussions, was a distinct
shift away from modernization practices of the previous decade.
During the 1960s, USAID focused on general resource transfers that helped
stabilize the newly emerging African nations but with the New Directions Mandate
USAID’s reentry into Rwanda would be drastically different. The most distinctive
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feature of the new mandate “was that it proposed to concentrate economic
assistance into five functional budget categories: Food and Nutrition, Population
Planning and Health, Education and Human Resource Development, Selected
Development Problems, and Selected Countries and Organizations.”15
Habyarimana’s rebranding of Rwanda as a development state appealed to aid
organizations and fit with the New Directions Mandated for USAID.
Habyarimana shifted the center of development in Rwanda from the major
cities to the rural communes, embracing the New Directions Mandate. USAID
“involv[ed] [the rural poor] directly in the development process.”16 Another major
difference from the 1960s was the removal of security projects from the
development sector. A 1973 Congressional Research Service summary concluded
“security assistance should be administered separately from development
assistance.”17 Despite previous projects assisting Rwanda with security, all
assistance in the 1970s was directed at improving basic human needs. The 1970s
saw rapid increases in aid, particularly during the later half, beginning with a
Congressional initiative and continued by President Carter.
This focus was reinforced with the election of President Jimmy Carter in
1976. The Carter Administration “entered office committed to the objectives of the
basic human needs mandate.”18 Over the course of the 1970s, the international
human rights movement gained momentum and “politicians, most notably President
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Jimmy Carter, started to invoke human rights as the guiding rationale of the foreign
policy of states.”19 Expanding his support for human rights in the 1980s, President
Carter added emphasis on women’s needs and advancements in U.S. foreign aid.
USAID annual reports demonstrate the wide variety of projects implemented to
improve basic human needs in the rural sector of Rwanda.
USAID relations with the Government of Rwanda improved with
Habyarimana’s regime. Starting in 1973, “the Government of Rwanda’s
development priorities were in step with USAID goals and strategies.”20 Over a
period of 18 months, four different USAID teams came to Rwanda to discuss projects
that would significantly contribute to the country’s development plan. Starting in
1974 the Government of Rwanda presented 23 project proposals to USAID. While
not all 23 were approved, eventually USAID programs increased from three in 1975
to twelve in 1980. The United States used to be a minor donor to Rwanda, but in the
last half of the 1970s, “the U.S. government began to put considerable effort into
developing and expanding its program in Rwanda.”21

The USAID Rwanda Annual Budget Submission for FY 1977, written in
August 1975 outlined some of the first projects implemented under the New
Directions Mandate. An initial project included Cooperative Development,
improving the access of the population living in cooperatives to development inputs,
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such as technical training sessions. This project “provided necessary underpinnings
to the Government of Rwanda program of developing local, specialized
cooperatives.”22 Emphasis was placed on production cooperatives, including both
agricultural and non‐agricultural cooperatives. Cooperative Development aimed to
organize people into groups in order to “allow other scarce resources to be utilized
more effectively [to] result in a synergistic effect.”23 The components of this project
included cooperative training, providing materials and equipment, and consultants.
The benefits helped the Government of Rwanda’s cooperative programs and
indirectly helped thousands of small rural farmers participating in cooperatives.
The short‐lived Cooperative Development project, working to reinforce the
new communal reorganization of Rwanda, represented the new goals with USAID’s
New Directions initiative by working directly with the rural population and
improving their standard of living economically, politically and socially. By helping
these communes recognize their human resource potential, identify strengths and
methods of better communication and teamwork these rural communities were
given possibilities to change their situation. This project did not continue for more
than a year because the Rwandan government was unable to identify specific
projects within cooperatives requiring further USAID assistance. But USAID was
able to help guide local participants and leaders in continuing to strengthen
cooperatives across the country.
Another project outlined in the Annual Budget Submission FY 1977 included
the Farm Hand Tools – Blacksmiths project. The project ran from 1975 through
22
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1978 and attempted to support rural vocational training by helping “Rwanda[n]
blacksmiths to the degree of skill necessary to manufacture and repair hand tools
commonly used or essential to the farm system and provide these with the
minimum necessary tool kit.”24 At the time, there were inadequate numbers of
blacksmiths available to provide and fix farm tools across Rwanda. This program
continued another project originally started by a Swiss development organization
and even used the original Swiss training site. The Swiss project was terminated
due to instability in Rwanda in 1972, and USAID made a few alternations when it
resumed the project in 1975. After review, the USAID Farm Tools Projected
provided consultants to create course materials to produce capable blacksmiths,
tuition assistance for 120 students annually for three years, basic tool kit for
graduates, and equipment for the training center.25
This project also helped create better economic conditions for farmers and
blacksmiths. Rwanda imported approximately 100,000 hoes annually. By
increasing the number of blacksmiths available within Rwanda, hoes could be
produced and sold locally, and materials repaired. Farm tools were predicted to last
three years with annual repairs necessary, with the calculation of 2,750,00 hand‐
tools existing and 900,000 needing repairs or replacement annually.26 This project
expanded a domestic market instead of relying on foreign imports. Rwanda had
been buying hoes from Great Britain, but with continued blacksmith training this
import could be eliminated, improving Rwanda’s economic possibilities.
24
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The Annual Budget Submission for FY 1979, written in June 1977, provided
an update and the last information available on the project. USAID continued to
assist reestablishing the blacksmith‐training center and provided technical
assistance and equipment.27 The project was terminated after the original three‐
year plan likely because USAID considered the number of proficient blacksmiths in
Rwanda sufficient. USAID assumed the Rwandan government would continue
support for vocational trainings, including the blacksmith project.
Similar to the assistance provided to communes through the Cooperative
Development project, the Blacksmith training program helped provide alternative
options to rural inhabitants. The majority of Rwandans were farmers and
increasing farming continually added more pressure to overused plots. This
problem was countered by the Blacksmith program as it increased educational
options with vocational training, relieved land pressures by reducing the number of
farmers, offered different economic options for the rural population and improved
the overall economic condition of Rwanda by eliminating a large import and
creating an emerging domestic market for farm tools creation and maintenance.
This project reflected the political changes within Rwanda and the changes in
USAID objectives during the 1970s. By focusing on rural employment options and
helping to reduce the number of farmers, the Blacksmith project followed the
Rwandan government’s command to direct foreign assistance to the rural
communes. After Habyarimana took power, he dedicated more attention and
assistance to developing Rwanda, emphasizing the rural sector of the country. It
27
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also reflected the changed political dynamic felt after Habyarimana’s coup. The
original Swiss project ended suddenly in 1972 with the outbreak of violence
originating in Burundi. Because Habyarimana calmed the on‐going ethnic
hostilities, the blacksmith project was able to resume and be completed by USAID.
The Rwandan government wasn’t the only entity refocusing assistance on the rural
sector. With the New Directions Mandate, USAID worked to create new projects
specific to problems in the countryside. The blacksmith project directly affected the
opportunities available to rural inhabitants, relieved pressures felt by rural farmers,
and improved the overall economic condition of the country by eliminating a regular
import from Europe.

A third project discussed in the Annual Budget Submission FY 1977 was the
Food Storage and Marketing project. This project began in 1975 and was
considered one of the most significant projects to Rwanda because “while there
were a relatively wide range of crops, inadequate transportation, limited markets,
low incomes, poor communication, and other factors combined to keep agricultural
crops from the markets.”28 The main outputs for the Food Storage and Marketing
project included eight warehouses, ten Rwandan trainees in the areas of food
storage and marketing, an operational food marketing office, procedures for
financial control and warehouse management, and a working capital fund for the
food marketing office.29 This project’s most important goal was to build adequate
storage facilities to help protect farmers’ crops. Rwandans suffered from
28
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malnutrition partly because a majority of their crops were lost to insects, animals,
and mold. By helping protect crops, the project’s goal was to increase to amount of
food for families to eat and sell in markets.
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1979 provided an update on the progress
of this project. Within two years of implementation, almost 4,000 tons of beans had
been stored. Rwanda sent a project manager to the United States to receive training
for project administration and analysis. The project was under revision, calling for
an expansion of the storage capacity in specific areas and construction of more
warehouses in others.30 The project remained fully staffed and continued to expand
due to its rapid success. Examination and expansions on this project continued into
the 1980s.
In the Budget Submission FY 1980, written in May 1978, the Food Storage
and Marketing project was updated again. The project’s purpose was to “create an
efficient food storage and marketing system for staple foods and reduce seasonal
and regional price fluctuations of staple foods.”31 USAID constructed food storage
warehouses, provided technical assistance and training that led to a price
stabilization program. This program’s aim was to increase food production while
reducing regional prices allowing producers to receive higher prices. If producers
could receive higher prices they would be encouraged to produce more for the
market. Since 1975, the Food Storage and Marketing program had expanded to
increase warehouse capacity and trained additional staff. Most importantly, since
1975, “4,450MT of beans, Rwanda’s staple crop, ha[d] been stored and 1,550MT
30
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sold.”32 This progress benefited the entire population of Rwanda. As the bean
prices stabilized, more beans were cultivated and sold, benefiting all Rwandans
economically and nutritionally. While the first stage of this project ended in
December 1980, in the Annual Budget Submission FY 1982, the Food Storage and
Market II project was outlined.
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1982, written in June 1980, explained and
detailed the extended Food Storage and Marketing II program. This extension
planned to “increase the impact and effectiveness of the Rwandan government’s
grain and food pulse storage and price stabilization program, and to develop a
strategic storage program.”33 USAID estimated that about forty percent of Rwanda’s
agricultural production was monetized, calling for continued assistance with the
Food Storage and Marketing project. The Food Storage and Marketing project
worked to increase the amount of crops available to be consumed and sold. With
the increasing monetization of crops, the project helped to continue that growth.
The plan extension
outlined programs to strengthen rural cooperatives to assemble and store
marketable farm surpluses and to expand the interregional transport and
marketing system for the transfer of surpluses to deficit areas. A more
efficient market will encourage increased production.34
The first stage of the project was effective in serving interregional markets, and the
second phase aimed to continue to expand the market successes. Ultimately the
success of this project led to expanded agricultural projects by USAID in Rwanda.
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While there were many more projects focusing on agricultural assistance,
there were two that most specifically helped the Food Storage and Marketing
project. The Cooperative Grain Storage and Local Crop Storage programs, initiated
in 1978 and 1979, helped address storage and marketing needs at local levels.
These programs provided “farmers the tools for increased control over timing of
sales and a wider range of marketing options, thus giving them a role to play in
establishing bean and sorghum prices.”35 The continuation of the Food Storage and
Marketing II project depended on regular examinations and will be discussed
further in the next chapter.
These agricultural assistance programs differed from projects during the
1960s in a few major ways. Under the modernization mandate of the 1960s, food
storage projects would have been geared toward developing modern industry for
trade. In contrast, under the needs mandate of the 1970s, these projects focused on
stabilizing food availability and prices for the local population. The Food Storage
and Marketing projects and the supporting agricultural programs worked to
increase farmers’ crops for local markets and personal consumption. Increasing the
amount of crops that survived each season led to increased availability and variety
for local farmers to sell and buy, improving rural economic and health conditions.
Advancing farmers’ financial situations and nutrition fell under Rwanda’s new focus
on rural communes and USAID’s New Directions Mandate. The amount of time and
resources made available to the Food Storage and Marketing projects demonstrated
another shift from the 1960s. In USAID’s first decade assisting Rwanda, there were
35
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fewer funds available and projects implemented. With the New Directions Mandate
there were increased levels of financial assistance and attention made available to
these new projects. The needs mandate employed by USAID during the 1970s
justified the shift from the modernization practices of the 1960s, emphasizing the
basic human needs of Rwanda’s rural inhabitants.
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1979 detailed another important project,
the Kibuye Agricultural School program that assisted the Government of Rwanda in
meeting its agricultural needs. The Kibuye Agricultural School was a major
institution that trained lower level agricultural staff.36 Because Rwanda was among
the six poorest countries in the world, had the highest population density in Africa,
and had over ninety percent of the population relying on agriculture for their
livelihood, the Kibuye Agricultural School was crucial to improving Rwanda’s
situation.
The purpose of this project was to “expand an institution that could provide a
greater number of practically trained agricultural technicians: extension agents,
school teachers and rural vocational education schools staff.”37 With better‐trained
agriculturalists and specialists, agricultural production in Rwanda could increase.
Over a three‐year period, USAID assisted the school in improving education by
providing consultants, trainings, logistical support, and materials. The Kibuye
School was unique in Rwanda and was the only school to train young men between
18 and 20 years old on advanced scientific agricultural practices.
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The two‐year program emphasized general agriculture, forestry, botany,
ecology, soil science, statistics, zoology, and vegetable production. USAID assistance
increased the number of graduates from 25 to 50 and provided more practical
instructional courses. The courses were improved with American teachers working
in Kibuye providing guidance for the Rwandan teachers.38 This assistance began in
FY 1979 and continued through FY 1981, assuming the government of Rwanda
would carry on support after 1981. From the mid‐1970s through the 1980s USAID
assisted and created several agricultural projects beyond the ones outlined above.
These other projects included supporting the women’s agricultural school and area
agricultural production.
The many agricultural development programs implemented by USAID helped
Rwanda in more ways than just food production. The Kibuye Agricultural School
provided increased educational options, similar to the Blacksmiths project, to the
rural population. While many could not afford to attend a Rwandan university, they
could benefit from the vocational training programs from USAID. The Agricultural
school taught Rwandans methods to improve and increase agricultural production,
which had obvious positive impacts. Malnutrition and starvation were addressed
with more food available for consumption and farmers improved economically with
more to sell in domestic markets. Despite improved growing techniques, without
appropriate storage facilities the increase crops would be lost. The Food Storage
and Marketing projects were supported by smaller scale, localized projects,
including the Cooperative Grain Storage and Local Crop Storage projects. These
38
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agricultural projects supported the New Directions Mandate and Rwandan
government development goals in a wide variety of ways, bettering the lives and
health of rural Rwandans leading to potential economic and social prosperity.
The New Directions Mandate didn’t solely emphasize improving rural
agriculture, but rural living conditions in general. Other projects originating in the
mid‐1970s and continuing through the next decade worked with infrastructure,
rural health, and family planning. Rwanda had no railroads and limited air
transport, making roads the primary mode of transportation. The road system
consisted of bituminous‐surfaced roads, re‐graveled roads, very old graveled roads
and laterite roads. Since 1971, traffic in Rwanda had grown at an annual rate of ten
percent and the number of registered vehicles in Rwanda in 1976 was almost
13,000. By improving the road system communications, rural development would
subsequently progress.39 One major project undertaken during the 1970s to
improve Rwanda’s limited transportation network was to modernize the Kibuye‐
Gitarama road. Formally known as the Rural Road project, this major project
included technical assistance, equipment, on‐the‐job‐training and financial support
to improve the entire length of road.
The Kibuye‐Gitarama Road is the main connection to the Nile Crest area, one
of the poorest and most densely populated areas of Rwanda. While infrastructure
was one of the primary focuses for USAID during the 1960s, this project differed
from those of old modernization mandate in significant ways. The most obvious
ways it varied from infrastructure projects of the past were the goals and intent
39
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behind the project. During the 1960s, projects were primarily in Kigali or other
urban centers; these roads were in the country, connecting rural, desperately poor
sections of Rwanda. The goal was no longer to help the government stabilize and
expand after independence, but to reach disconnected regions of Rwanda. Beyond
the objective to expand Rwanda’s roadways, the Rural Road project built this road
specifically to improve the connection between modernized Rwanda and this
extremely poor section of the country. The intent to allow assistance to reach this
region was more important than the actual construction of the road because the
New Directions Mandate put more emphasis on improving standards of living than
on the infrastructure projects of the past.
The Rural Road project would repair the 93 km road between Kibuye and
Gitarama over three years. The population along the Zaire‐Nile Crest benefited from
increased communications, decreased transportation costs, and wider access to
markets for both selling and buying. The Ministry of Public Works also benefited
with the possibility of allocating more funds to other road repairs and the guidance
of foreign technicians involved in this project.
The Annual Budget Report FY 1981, written in June 1979, provided a midway
report on the Rural Roads project. The repairs to this stretch of road positively
impacted the 600,000 inhabitants of the region socially and economically.40 The
Rwandan government provided supervision and skilled labor from the Public Works
ministry and unskilled labor from the region. During FY 1980, tests and designs
were completed, identifying problem areas, and the necessary equipment was
40
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delivered. For FY 1981, construction of the road surface, culverts and bridges
began. With the rate of progress continuing uninterrupted, the Rural Road project
was completed in the three‐year timeline and improved living conditions to an
enormously important and disconnected section of the Rwandan population.
The Rural Road project connecting Kibuye and Gitarama worked to
implement USAID’s New Directions Mandate and Rwandan government’s goals of
bringing development assistance to the rural population. This Road project allowed
the poorest section of Rwanda access to development aid. By making the region
more accessible not only would USAID be able to expand projects focused on these
communities, but other donors could also become involved. Before addressing the
basic human needs of the regions, donors needed to access the population for
assessment.
Another project aimed at helping Rwandan farmers described in the Annual
Budget Report FY 1981 was the Fish Culture program. The project worked to
“develop the capacity of Rwandan farmers to build and maintain productive on‐farm
fish ponds.”41 There was a high demand for fresh fish in Rwanda and the materials
necessary for fish farming were readily available in rural sectors, creating a
possibility to improve economic conditions and the health of rural Rwandans. The
USAID Fish Culture project in Rwanda was based on the fish undertaken by colonial
administrators in Zaire during the 1950s. This project required Zairians to build
ponds and farm fish for several years. While the ponds were abandoned after
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independence, the initial results benefited the farmers involved.42 USAID’s support
for Rwandan Fish Farms was consistent with the New Directions initiative to
increase food production and combat malnutrition. The predicted benefits were
numerous and could have affected the entire country. An estimated 1,200 fishponds
would produce 36MT of fish on 600 farms in ten Rwandan prefectures with USAID’s
support.
An updated report on the Fish Farms showed positive growth. The project
planning began in 1978 for FY 1980, but before the project even began, the Fish
Culture project was extended to FY 1984 in 1979. The Rwandan government
provided personnel for extension services and pond construction, workspace for
technical staff and land for the ponds. This project addressed several of the New
Directions initiatives: to combat health problems, expand food production and offer
alternative crops for farmers to grow.
Similar to the positive benefits of the agricultural projects, the Fish Culture
project demonstrated the New Directions Mandate and Rwandan government
initiatives by adding economic, environmental and nutritional diversity in the rural
sectors of Rwanda. The Fish Culture program offered a new option for farmers in
the market, to reduce land pressure, and improve the health of the populace. Most
farmers grew the same crops, creating more competition in the market. By adding
fish to the array of options, economic gain was possible. This helped to alleviate the
overuse of Rwanda’s farmlands and gave farmers a new income source that would
not deplete fields of valuable nutrients. Finally, diets were improved with needed
42
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supplements, including protein and iron from fish. These three areas specifically
demonstrated the Rwandan government and New Directions goals of addressing
family health care, agricultural assistance and environmental degradation.
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1980 also described the first health
services project addressing rural health care and family planning. The Rural
Health/Family Planning program worked to “improve the capacity of the Rwandan
Government to deliver rural health services by up‐grading and creating the services
at the dispensary and health center levels.”43 Until this project, USAID’s only
involvement in Rwanda’s health sector was through PL 480 assistance, run by the
Catholic Relief Services funding nutrition centers and school feeding programs. The
project directly addressed the rapid population growth occurring in Rwanda,
stressing agricultural production, among many other areas. The Rural
Health/Family Planning program focused “on nutrition, preventive medicine and
family planning by improving the national health delivery system at the clinic and
dispensary levels.”44 USAID recognized the enormous undertakings this project
would entail and continued regular updates on its progress in subsequent reports.
The Annual Budget Submission FY 1981 provided the first‐year update on
the project. To assist the Rwandan government in making existing medical services
more efficient and effective, USAID helped emphasize preventive medicine in the
rural sector. At the same time, USAID focused on the rapid population growth
occurring in Rwanda and promoted knowledge of child spacing techniques,
establishing education family planning activities and eventually implementing a
43
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national family planning program. In FY 1980, the project began training programs
for health workers and construction of rural health centers.45 The project had a
termination date of FY 1984 because the Government of Rwanda demonstrated
increased interest and motivation to tackle the burgeoning population problem.
While this specific program didn’t continue past the mid‐1980s, USAID continued to
be a primary donor to Rwandan efforts to cope with excessive population growth by
funding educational family health programs.
The Rural Health/Family Planning project was the most direct project
implementing the goals of the Rwandan government and the New Directions
Mandate. The other programs described above executed many of the set goals in a
variety of ways, while the health programs directly bettered the standard of living
for rural Rwandans. This health project worked solely to improve the health of
Rwandan families, particularly mothers and children. By offering classes on
nutrition, child spacing, and preventative medicine in the rural sector, the overall
health of Rwandans improved, thus positively affecting the production, education
and the outlook of development. With reduced levels of stress on families, farmers
could be stronger and more productive, children could participate more fully in
school, and the involvement in development programs could increase.
All of the projects described worked toward implementing the New
Directions goals in Rwanda by focusing on agriculture, health, and education to
improve the standard of living for Rwandans. In the Annual Budget Submission FY
1982, written in June 1980, USAID outlined its long‐range goals to continue helping
45
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rural Rwandans into the 1980s. These future goals included “achievement and
maintenance of normal food self‐sufficiency, development of infrastructure to
improve delivery of essential services and off‐farm employment opportunities,
establish a viable system of storage and marketing of basic crops and protection of
natural resources.”46 Because USAID was involved in the beginning stages of key
sector development programs, the USAID program in Rwanda was not predicted to
change dramatically for the next three to five years into the mid‐1980s. But with
declining economic conditions in Rwanda and changes in the political leadership of
the United States, U.S. foreign assistance policy would take another turn.
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Chapter 3: Economic Instability and the Reagan Era
While 1962 and 1973 marked years where changes in both Rwanda and the
U.S. transpired nearly simultaneously – the creation of USAID and Rwandan
independence; the New Directions Mandate and Rwanda’s military coup – political
and ideological shifts affecting aid during the 1980s in the two countries were
separated by several years. Apart from this difference, all three decades and shifts
did share the main characteristic that the ramifications of these signal events took
years to emerge, demonstrating the long and complicated process of development
work. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 altered the direction of American
foreign policy and USAID’s mission away from a needs mandate. Like most changes
of administration, the new focus took time to be cultivated and implemented in
Rwanda. This is evident from the new programs that emerged in Rwanda
throughout the decade. Growing economic instability in the 1980s also led to an
eventual collapse of the Rwandan market in 1986. After investigating the events in
the United States and Rwanda, an analysis of USAID documents and project reports
in Rwanda during the 1980s will show how these events influenced development
policy and practice.

During the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. “aid for development ha[d] alternated
between an emphasis on promoting growth – through economic reforms,
infrastructure expansion, business service centers – and addressing problems of
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poverty directly, for example, by expanding basic health and education.”1 By the
time Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980, the U.S. was returning to policy
reforms that focused on fiscal policy and supply‐side economics rather than state
interventionist policy. The return to a free market focus differed from the initial
programs in the 1960s that assisted the newly founded country to stabilize after
decolonization. Reagan’s “main interest was the Cold War, and he used foreign aid
to directly promote U.S. security interests.”2 Included with the reemergence of
security issues and economic goals, USAID began to narrow and reduce the goals
promoted through the New Directions Mandate.
The excitement of increased aid in the 1970s led to a variety of new projects
in Rwanda and, as the 1980s progressed, USAID began to narrow on the more
crucial and pressing problems, such as agricultural production and demographics.
USAID not only focused in on specific areas for projects, but also worked to continue
the most effective and worthwhile approaches. The narrowed scope of these
projects did continue initiatives from the New Directions Mandate, but they also
indirectly, and occasionally directly, affected the economic and security programs
proposed by Reagan. These goals were met through
an integrated assistance program focusing on free market principles, private
sector dialogues, and technical assistance projects which promote
agricultural production, natural resource management, family planning,
small and medium enterprises and human resource development training.3
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The benefits and end products of the continued selected New Directions projects
implicitly supported the new economic goals of USAID. For example, the increased
agricultural output following new farming techniques taught by USAID also led to
more crops to sell and trade in USAID market projects. In the 1980s, these
continuing projects did not receive headline attention, but were consistently
discussed in USAID documents, as shown later in the chapter.
While U.S. foreign aid ideology shifted towards liberalism in the 1980s, the
continuation of basic human needs projects in Rwanda also demonstrated the
realities of aid on the ground. Rwanda is a prime example of the duality of foreign
aid, an example that demonstrated both the ideology and actuality of development.
In each decade studied, the broad themes of U.S. foreign aid can be seen, from
modernization in the 1960s to the needs mandate of the 1970s. Despite the shift
towards free market policies in the 1980s, projects working to improve basic human
needs show the reality of aid in recipient countries. Because Rwanda was small and
strategically unimportant, aid workers on the ground used their discretion to
continue projects necessary to Rwandan development, regardless of the directions
given in Washington.
The new Republican platform set the tone for Reagan’s approach to U.S.
foreign assistance. While many projects from the past continued into the 1980s,
programs with similar goals continued to be created, including agricultural support
and family planning initiatives. In the last years of the Carter Administration and
continuing during both of Reagan’s terms, assistance policy “moved away from basic
human needs and toward more security domination and the move away from
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security toward a policy of greater economic cooperation.”4 Essentially, the Reagan
administration’s “foreign assistance objectives in Africa [included] fostering
economic development through financing projects or balance‐of‐payments support
conditioned on policy reforms, and providing humanitarian relief.”5 These
objectives were fiscal, supply‐side concerns associated with market reforms and
were paired with improving the private sector and business opportunities in both
Africa and Rwanda.
The policy shift represented both the changing needs in recipient countries
and long‐term U.S. goals. The strengthening of Cold War rhetoric added to increased
security concerns and economic objectives combining Rwandan needs and U.S.
concerns. As Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense for Kennedy and Johnson
described, “security is development. Without development there can be no security.
A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain secure.”6
Preventing the spread of communism to the developing world was a continued and
increased security interest for Reagan. While this was primarily a U.S. concern,
American policy makers justified it as defending democracy and capitalism for
Rwanda. Development aid in the 1980s “shifted back to supporting growth and
emphasized funding of essential economic reforms” to help private investment rise
and lead to faster growth, “as opposed to poverty alleviation during the 1970s.”7
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The shift in the United States toward economic conditionality began because
of the growing international debt crisis. In the late 1970s, the Rwandan economy
improved because tea, coffee, and cocoa prices tripled between 1975 and 1977.
Drought in India and frosts in Brazil benefitted African exporters including Kenya,
Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.8 By the early 1980s, however, growth was slowing
as Asian and American crops recovered and “export revenues declined, import costs
rose, and budgets increased, and governments found themselves seriously strapped
for cash.”9 Facing severe economic crises, many African governments, including the
Rwandan government, sought increased aid and debt relief. The general pattern
was also that poor countries, such as Rwanda, took out loans to continue investing
in basic needs projects, which led to further indebtedness. Following
Habyarimana’s 1970s campaign to increase Rwandan development, the government
was forced to borrow more money to continue their own projects, fund new offices,
and create new departments. These pleas were met with the latest shift in U.S.
foreign policy directed specifically at economic concerns.
While recognizing the important shift toward market liberalism in American
foreign policy objectives, an examination of the situation leading to the economic
downfalls of the 1980s in Rwanda is also necessary. During the 1970s, Rwanda had
a smaller, more reasonable reliance on aid, but by the 1980s this dependence had
grown enormously. The economic collapse resulting from many crop and market
failures in Rwanda led to a decade of uncertainty and hardships. As export monies
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dried up, Rwanda began borrowing heavily. The Rwandan government had started
multiple development projects during the 1970s following President Habyarimana’s
declaration to improve living conditions across the country. With many large new
programs beginning in the early 1980s, the government was forced to borrow
money to continue domestic development, specifically in the rural sectors of
Rwanda.
There were consistent increases in food production in Rwanda from the
1960s through the early 1980s, but by 1985 production began to stagnate. Although
growth remained at a reasonable rate, “between the mid‐1970s and the 1980s the
combination of a drought and a decrease in international demand left Rwanda with
a heavy debt burden.”10 The price of coffee, Rwanda’s main export crop, had fallen
since 1977, “then rose again after 1980 before finally collapsing in 1986.”11 This
inconsistency was the primary cause of Rwanda’s economic collapse, despite
increased USAID economic projects in the country. The economic crises were first
agricultural before becoming financial.
There were more factors affecting Rwanda’s financial problems than simply
plummeting coffee prices. While coffee was Rwanda’s chief export, the country also
suffered from failing tea and foodstuffs prices, along with troubles in the tin and
aluminum mining sectors. By 1985, tea exports lost up to forty percent of their
value, which compounded the declining prices of coffee. The decrease in food
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production appeared even more drastic than the situation with tea and coffee in
global markets. Peter Uvin aptly describes the declining production,
Maize production fell from 110,00 tons in 1983 to 90,000 by 1986 and
subsequently stagnated [at the] 90,000 to 100,000 [ton] range. Similarly,
sorghum production, which was at 213,000 tons in 1982, slid erratically
downward to approximately 140,00 tons in 1988 and 1989. Over the period
1984 to 1991, kilocalories produced by Rwandan farmers dropped from
2,055 per person per day to 1,509.12
These changes decreased from an already low level of production to an intolerably
minimal amount. As most Rwandans were farmers, their personal incomes were
affected by the decrease in agricultural production. The slump also affected
Rwandans who were not farmers but faced inflation, poor market prices for other
trade items, and increased unemployment. This conjunction contributed to an
agricultural emergency.
The agricultural and economic collapse that affected Rwanda was as much
tied to natural forces as it was to market declines. A 1984 drought was followed by
excessive rain in 1987 and plant disease in 1988. Paired with these natural changes,
increased land pressure, soil erosion and poverty compounded the situation.13
Increasing population rates in Rwanda, already the most densely populated country
in Africa, did not help. But the agricultural calamities listed don’t provide the full
explanation for Rwanda’s economic problems, as the “collapse of the mining sector,
together with the fall in coffee prices, brought about a new, more severe crisis.”14
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Following the collapse of coffee prices, world tin prices fell and led to the
closing of Rwanda’s mines. The companies in charge of Rwanda’s other mineral
exports, including cassiterite and bauxite,15 closed their production and further
deprived Rwandans of revenue. The collapse of these crops and markets led to tens
of thousands of unemployed young men without future job prospects. It was this
situation that USAID attempted to combat. While Rwanda ultimately suffered an
economic meltdown, the efforts of USAID may have alleviated some suffering. The
collapse demonstrated how desperately Rwanda needed help from organizations
like USAID.

Along with demonstrating what crucial social development programs
continued from the 1970s into the 1980s, USAID documents also show the shifting
goals toward market initiatives of the 1980s. As outlined by the USAID report on
the history of its involvement in Rwanda, during 1980 the overall mission
development goals were to “increase per capita food production and effect a general
improvement in the health status of the Rwandan family, while bringing the
demographic problem in balance with development potential.”16 USAID could more
easily roll over projects started in the 1970s, but projects focusing specifically on
the evolving economic downturn took longer to be created and implemented. Along
with the ease of continuing basic needs programs, USAID workers in Rwanda
recognized the need to maintain projects from the 1970s despite the changed
15 Cassiterite is a reddish, brownish or yellowing mineral containing tin dioxide. It is the
main ore of tin. Bauxite is a clayey rock that is the chief commercial ore of aluminum.
16 Lynn Elizabeth Grosz, “A History of the USAID Program in Rwanda 1962‐1985.” (Kigali,
Rwanda, 1986), unpublished report available at USAID DEC, 17.
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ideology in Washington. Multiple projects demonstrated how USAID continued to
tackle the areas of increased interest from the 1970s.
Beginning with projects to improve family health, USAID teamed with
organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to address diseases afflicting
children worldwide. Rwanda was one of the first countries to be included in the
program Combatting (sic) Communicable Childhood Diseases (CCCD) that began in
1979 to fight several basic illnesses faced by children. By the first months of 1980,
the Centers for Disease Control in coordination with USAID began the Expanded
Program for Immunizations. This program, with support and funding from CCCD,
worked to “immunize children under five against measles, diphtheria, tetanus,
pertussis, tuberculosis and polio.”17 Providing crucial services and materials, USAID
was an integral part of this program’s success. The vaccines were administered
through local dispensaries but needed to remain cold until injection. USAID
provided the cold chain materials that kept the medicine refrigerated from the
manufacturer until they were locally dispensed.18
In May 1988, an external evaluation team produced the “Rwanda CCCD End
of Project Evaluation.” This extensive document outlined the key goals, projects
implemented, and their success and failure rates for the eight years the project ran.
This project was intended
to strengthen institutional support for these interventions by developing an
effective, simplified health information system, strengthen established
training and health information efforts, reinforce systems of supervision,
17
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support operations research and other studies, and encourage the
development of self‐financing mechanisms.19
These goals were clearly seen throughout many of the programs implemented, most
specifically in the Expanded Program for Immunization in Rwanda.
The report explains the end results for the Expanded Program for
Immunizations, with the success rates for each disease targeted. The tuberculosis
vaccine provided increased coverage from 49 percent in 1983 to 90 percent in
1987; the diphtheria‐pertussis‐tetanus vaccine coverage increased from 36 percent
to 79 percent; trivalent oral polio vaccine went from 25 percent to almost 80
percent; and measles prevention went from 53 percent coverage to 75.20 These
increases in the number of immunizations given, though they unfortunately did not
eliminate the diseases entirely, did have a major impact on development in Rwanda.
By significantly reducing the number of people susceptible to these ailments,
Rwanda and other health organizations were able to focus on other more persistent
afflictions, such as malaria and newly emerging diseases like HIV/AIDS.21
The results above were presented in USAID documents and may contain a
certain amount of bias, but the CCCD program operated around the globe and had
significant success outside of Rwanda as well. According to the World Health
Organization, by 1988 “polio cases worldwide decreased by over 99 percent and
only four countries retain polio,” not including Rwanda.22 While this is one disease,
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it supports the fact that rates of diseases were declining with health campaigns,
including the Expanded Program for Immunizations in Rwanda. Related to health
concerns, USAID also continued to work on demographic problems in Rwanda.
While it may appear paradoxical to reduce disease rates in the most densely
populated country in Africa, ultimately the end result of both health programs and
demographic projects were complimentary. In the short run, diminished infection
rates did increase pressure on scarce resources, however, improving the health of
Rwandans eventually led to lower birth rates, positively affecting demographics. By
implementing health and demographic programs at the same time, retention of
population growth improved.
Population growth rates became a major concern for the United States
during the 1960s and 1970s, but were not acknowledged by developing regions
until the 1980s. In 1981, USAID began a major long‐term bilateral project with the
Government of Rwanda to establish a National Office of Population. The decree was
approved in September 1980, after years of Rwandan denial of a growing
population issue, and the National Population Office was created in the following
year. The project helped create methods to collect population data and
subsequently analyze and evaluate the research. The Office began “carrying out
studies of the problems affecting the growth of the population, evaluat[ing] the
importance of these problems and propos[ing] solutions.”23 The data collected by
the new office helped Rwanda develop methods to curtail growth rates with
guidance and support from USAID. USAID brought demographics issues to the
23
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government’s attention, provided evidence, supported Rwanda’s own Population
Office, and eventually made Rwanda capable of addressing and solving their own
demographic problems.
Practices to curb population growth and improve maternal and child health
care continued in several projects through to the start of the 1990s. Plans
established during the final years of the 1980s lay out the Family Planning II project.
The main goal of this project was to reduce fertility rates, but also worked to
improve the health and survival rates of children and thereby encourage parents to
have fewer children. By teaching preventative healthcare and encouraging
Rwandans to have more wanted and planned pregnancies, this project fell in line
with Reagan’s enforcement of the Mexico City policy. While the Mexico City policy
required all organizations (state and non‐governmental) that received federal
funding to refrain from performing or promoting abortion services, the Family
Planning II project worked to reduce fertility rates by preventing unwanted
pregnancies, not aborting them. Working from and expanding on evidence and
materials provided in previous maternal and child health care programs and
demographic projects, the Family Planning II program’s base “for policy making was
improved because of better quality, timeliness and utilization of family planning
statistics.”24 The variety in these approaches allowed USAID to teach better health
practices and support Rwanda in establishing their own strategy for tackling
population pressures.
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Development of agricultural production complimented demographic
concerns and the aim to improve Rwandans health. In March 1979, the possibility
of administering a survey and analysis of agriculture in Rwanda was first proposed,
and resulted in the USAID Agricultural Education Project. The Rwandan Ministry of
Agriculture assisted USAID with investigating the yearly food data and production
rates. In July 1979, a team of U.S. consultants worked with the Ministry in Rwanda
to prepare an ‘Outline of a Possible Collaborative Survey and Analysis of Agriculture
in Rwanda.’ Based on the suggestions from the research team, a series of small
projects were designed to help improve and increase production, training, and data
collection.25 There were many other projects based in agricultural production that
coincided with the early 1980s.
In June 1981, the Budget Submission Report for FY 1983 outlined another
agricultural project set to start by the end of 1983. The purpose of this project
transferred “the results of relevant agricultural research to the farm level in selected
regions, and test[ed] the feasibility of valley land agricultural production.”26 During
the 1970s, food production in Rwanda had stagnated due to increased population
pressures. With the assistance of the Rwandan government, which provided
personnel and operational support, small farmers were the focus for direct benefits
with new agricultural technologies. The aim was for Rwandan families to have more
food available and improve the health of the population (including fertility rates) by
improving small farm production.
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Other projects worked to improve the amount of food available to Rwandan
farmers and increase their daily food intake. These projects began in the 1970s and
continued into the 1980s. The Food Storage and Marketing program, discussed in
depth in chapter two, had a large impact on farm production. Stemming from the
Food Storage and Marketing program, the Local Crop Storage Program also
supported the efforts to protect crops and help small farmers protect their produce
from rodents and rot. Lastly, the Fish Culture Program worked to reduce the
amount of farmers plowing overused land, and provided needed nutritional benefits
of protein and other vitamins into the diets of Rwandans. With the health programs
discussed above, USAID agricultural programs helped address health issues and the
growing population problems in Rwanda.
The family health and agricultural programs discussed above indirectly
demonstrate the new development goals of the 1980s. Supporting the government
of Rwanda’s third five‐year development plan with the new initiatives from the
Reagan administration, these health‐related projects aimed to improve both the
social and economic conditions of Rwanda. The four projects that addressed
immunizations, population control, and family health practices continued into the
1980s and represented Reagan’s initiatives. Rwanda’s economic conditions would
have no chance of survival if the population growth rate was not addressed.
Immunizing more children, promoting healthier rearing practices and teaching
improved agricultural methods led to better economic possibilities. Accompanying
the basic needs programs that indirectly contributed to the new economic goals of
the 1980s were programs that directly affected the market reform policies. The
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Maternal Child Health/Family Planning II Project, for example, provided “funds for
private sector family planning delivery services.”27 By continuing basic needs
programs through private sector organizations, the goals of the 1970s also directly
supported the new initiatives of the 1980s.
The initiatives behind these projects demonstrate the changed USAID
directives of the 1980s from the 1970s. With the New Directions Mandate in the
1970s, these health practices were have been geared toward improving the living
conditions in Rwanda. While the projects in the 1980s still achieved the same
outcome, improving the basic needs of the rural poor, the motivation behind these
projects differed. In the 1980s, USAID worked to achieve economic reforms; and
without addressing the problems of a sickly populace and uncontrollable population
growth, the economic conditions in Rwanda would not have been able to improve.
Although agriculture continued to be important, USAID’s main focus in
Rwanda during the 1980s turned to market reforms. While the projects discussed
above did not directly affect the economic conditions in Rwanda, they had a large
indirect impact. The capability of Rwandans to increase agricultural outputs and
improve economic possibilities was encouraged by controlling the population
growth rates and improving rural health. The principal causes of poverty and
constraints to development of any kind include “population pressures, low level
agricultural production, and limited trained manpower.”28 USAID began more
directly addressing the material improvements of Rwandans’ lives and worked to
increase economic activity throughout the 1980s.
27
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In 1983, USAID readjusted its main development goals in accordance with
changes in the situation within Rwanda. The year before, in 1982 Rwanda released
its third five year plan for development, working to “satisfy the food needs of the
population; promote better use of the country’s human resources; improve the
living conditions of the population; and improve Rwanda’s position vis à vis the
exterior.”29 The new USAID strategies expanded upon and worked with the latest
Rwandan development plan for 1982‐1986. By 1985, USAID’s strategies were fine‐
tuned to address four primary U.S. concerns: “policy reforms that decentralize
administrative structures, rely on free market forces and limited population growth
rates; private enterprise development; technology transfer and research; and
institutional development.”30 By combining the new USAID goals and Rwandan
initiatives, projects working to improve the daily lives of Rwandans continued while
newly developed economic programs were implemented.
USAID enacted several economic policy programs throughout the 1980s, but
there was one primary project that began in 1985. USAID and Rwanda signed the
Policy Reform Initiatives in Manufacturing and Employment (PRIME) agreement to
“support Rwandan efforts to make necessary structural adjustments and policy
changes in order to stimulate production and employment in the manufacturing
sector.”31 Essentially, PRIME was a policy reform project that sought to change
Rwanda’s policy in favor of private sector development. This project combined the
new economic initiatives of USAID and continued the social developments outlined
29
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by the Rwandan government. Because of a small economic crisis in Rwanda during
1983 to 1984, PRIME worked to help the country recover and make improvements
for the future.32
The project consisted of different parts, including financial support for
technical assistance and administering specific studies. These studies included
looking at industrial incentives and analyses of household budgets. Other objectives
included improving agricultural technologies and services to maternal and child
health, including family planning, and encouraging economic growth and on‐farm
employment opportunities. All these objectives shaped “incentives for agricultural
producers, … the demographic problem, and … the role of the private sector in the
economy.”33 USAID and the Rwandan government continued to work together
through the PRIME project to improve overall economic conditions for the country.
An update on PRIME’s progress was provided in the “Action Plan for FY
1990‐1991,” written in May 1989. The private sector was used to increase rural per
capita incomes, and had been making real progress. Through the objective to
increase general rural employment, USAID and the Rwandan government made
several policy changes allowing for conditions more favorable for the private sector.
One example included a “redirection from privatization of state‐owned enterprises
to emphasizing small and medium enterprises.”34 With yearly checks, PRIME
remained on target, and made small adjustments along the way that continued into
the 1990s.
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PRIME was a perfect example of a market reform project that also considered
how social development concerns could affect their economic goals. Many of the
other programs employed during the 1980s did not take as many issues into
account; negative market predictions for the future that influenced other economic
programs more heavily. For example, in January 1981 when the “Country
Development Strategy Statement for FY 1983” was being written, USAID workers
were worried for Rwanda’s economic future. Rwanda’s economy was almost
completely dependent on the agricultural sector that provided almost ninety
percent of the population with its livelihood. Agriculture’s “share of the gross
domestic product (GDP) had fallen from 76 percent in 1964 to 49 percent in 1976
and was expected to fall further to 40 percent in 1980.”35 This made prospects for
1980 unfavorable.
Predictions for the other areas of production in Rwanda were also
pessimistic. The growth predicted in GDP was not expected to cover the population
growth rate for the proceeding years as well as decline in agricultural production
resulting from poor weather conditions. The development of the agriculture sector
“has received paramount consideration in the economic development strategy, with
the government’s overriding objectives being to attain relative self‐sufficiency in
foodstuffs.”36 USAID recognized falling tea and coffee prices as a potential for
economic disaster. Coffee production in 1980 was projected to fall 21 percent to
21,400 tons from the previous year. Other crops had also been falling, including

35
36

USAID/Rwanda, “Development Strategy: FY 1983,” 1.
USAID/Rwanda, “Development Strategy: FY 1983,” 1.

72
pyrethrum and cinchona (quinine).37 The debt‐service ratio38 was also increasing in
1980, from 1.3 percent in 1970 to 3.8 percent in 1980 and a forecast of 4.0 percent
in 1981.39 Rwanda had borrowed money to fund its development projects and keep
the country running as the GDP fell. All of these factors were creating a worsening
picture for Rwanda.
USAID created new financial aid programs to address issues with the
worsening economic realities in Rwanda. In May 1986, the “Annual Budget
Submission for FY 1988” listed the revised objectives for Rwanda. Building off
increasing per capita food production and improving Rwandan families health
statuses, USAID added “increasing employment and income especially of the rural
population through the promotion of private enterprise and increase agricultural
production by raising the productivity and profitability of farming,”40 to the list of
goals. USAID created dozens of projects in Rwanda by the mid‐1980s and the
organization learned that by dedicating more time to researching and
understanding the situation in Rwanda, projects were more likely to succeed by
USAID terms. Since the United States was “viewed as one of the leaders in
promoting institutional reforms needed to implement economic policy change,” the
projects aimed to help Rwanda recover had to be well planned.41
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Beginning in the late 1980s, USAID began two programs focused on
enterprise development, one private and the other rural, both quintessential
interests of market reform – promoting entrepreneurship, private enterprise, and
policy reforms favorable to markets. The Private Enterprise Development project
had two targets. The first target was to provide reinforced management, financial
and marketing skills to small and medium enterprises. This entailed hiring trained
employees in the private sector and offering twenty seminars for on‐the‐job
training. The second target was to identify appropriate technologies for the rural
area. While ‘appropriate technologies’ was a 1970s basic needs buzzword, the idea
behind finding technology best suited for developing regions continued with new
development trends. An example provided of appropriate technology included
installing sunflower mills in different cooperatives. The Rural Enterprise
Development program identified new opportunities for rural investments. This
project increased the involvement of non‐governmental organizations (NGO) in
private enterprise development and offered courses in accounting and feasibility
studies to help make rural employees more desirable.42 NGOs were promoted
during both the 1970s and 1980s, but for different reasons. The basic needs
mandate of the 1970s saw NGOs as more local, closer to the poor, and smaller; but
the 1980s reformers viewed them as non‐state, private organizations.
Outlined in 1989, USAID began a Local Currency program that worked to
increase private sector economic growth in the rural provinces of Rwanda. Support
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from this project provided over 850,000 U.S. dollars43 for rural infrastructure. Rural
infrastructure included centers for artisans, small producers and cooperative
members. Almost 700,000 dollars were given to support rural artisans and youth
groups. This support came in the form of training on management principles,
entrepreneurship, and cooperative development. 440,000 dollars were given for
Rwandans working in small industries to receive training and study tours. Finally,
almost 100,000 dollars were provided to finance training activities for women, with
another 65,000 for credit available to participating women.44
For FY 1990, the Rwandan government redirected emphasis from
privatization to support for small and medium enterprises. This redirection
supported USAID strategies to increase productive off‐farm employment
opportunities. The USAID strategy continued to support “the private sector through
providing support directly to the government of Rwanda through [their] private
sector projects or by financing studies through PRIME.”45 USAID’s private sector
strategy was designed to complement Rwanda’s privatization plans, so as to
increase the possibilities for success.
Rwanda initially launched their privatization efforts in the mid‐1980s, but
little progress had been made by October 1986 when the government developed a
draft privatization strategy. Privatization had been focused toward “improving
parastatal efficiency,” but following the economic crises attention was focused on
immediate budget and balance of payment problems. With the government of
43
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Rwanda’s attention diverted, USAID worked to begin privatizing small sectors
including nurseries, bakeries and fisheries. Fortunately, progress was made under
PRIME, “where the government of Rwanda show[ed] stronger interests in
promoting the private sector in key areas such as tourism, transport, education and
trade.” Following USAID’s lead, Rwanda planned to improve the “business
investment climate by easing restrictions and administrative procedures for new
firms.”46
One final economic project designed in the late 1980s included another Rural
Enterprise Development Project (while this project had the same name as a
previous project, it was a distinct program). Five million dollars were designated
for dispersal by FY 1992 to help create productive rural employment. According to
the report, “the Cooperative Training and the Private Enterprise projects ha[d]
shown that small and medium enterprises, when given assistance, training and
credit, can increase productivity and member’s per capita income and stimulate
rural investment.”47 The Rural Enterprise Development project built on the success
of these two past projects with technical assistance and training for both rural men
and women.
The economic development projects described represent the direct methods
USAID employed in the 1980s. While the social projects continued from the 1970s
indirectly helped economic conditions, the programs of the 1980s actively worked
to help private, public, and rural development. It took years for the Rwandan
46
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economy to collapse, and years for USAID to create more appropriate programs to
address these failing conditions. But with the new directions from Reagan, the
economic mindset was ready in USAID to help Rwanda recover.
While USAID continued the most important basic needs programs in Rwanda
from the 1970s, these projects also contributed to the new focus on market reform.
USAID’s increased focus on Rwandan economic growth during the 1980s began with
the election of President Reagan providing the American stimulus and inconsistent
commodity prices on Rwanda’s exports, thus providing the Rwandan stimulus. With
a refocus on economic and market issues from USAID and a new crucial need for
financial assistance in Rwanda, these two shifts worked in tandem to address the
problems of the 1980s.

Conclusion
In 1990, after the country’s economic collapse, the Rwandan government
signed a structural adjustment program (SAP) with the World Bank to address the
country’s continued financial decline. Initially Rwanda resisted signing the SAP
because of the stipulations attached to the agreement, but with years of pressure
from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adjust its economic
position finally, the Rwandan government agreed in 1990. These provisions
included many fundamental structural changes to the Rwandan government.
Rwanda received $90 million in SAP loans to promote fiscal and monetary
discipline. The goals of the SAP included boosting coffee exports, reducing imports,
and devaluing the Rwandese franc. 1 While the IMF and World Bank began handling
Rwanda’s economic recovery, the United States refocused USAID projects to reflect
the latest shifts.
Three major events in the early 1990s dramatically affected USAID’s policies
in Rwanda. First, a stipulation that accompanied the structural adjustment program
required that Rwanda would become a multiparty democracy in 1990. Second,
almost immediately following this change, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF),
comprised of Tutsi refugees from Uganda, invaded Rwanda on October 1, 1990.
This marked the beginning of a four‐year civil war, eventually leading to genocide.
Third, the end of the Cold War in 1991 significantly transformed U.S. foreign policy.
These shifts guided USAID projects to expand democracy in Rwanda.
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The Annual Budget Submission FY 1993, written June 1991, explained the
changing situation in Rwanda and the new USAID goals for democratization. The
USAID team “decided that the time [was] right for increased U.S. activities in
support of the democratization process.”2 The objectives for these new projects
included support for improved governance and strengthening local administrative
structures. While there are other examples, the following project shows a general
approach of USAID’s support for Rwanda’s transition.
The Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project Identification Document
Outline from April 1992 describes the progressing democratization of Rwanda with
USAID’s assistance. The new Democratic Initiatives and Governance project worked
to “produce a new social contract in Rwanda through which all the Rwandan people
share equitably in the processes of democratic self‐governance, peacefully enjoy
basic freedom and justice.”3 This project reflected a new type of USAID programs
designed to promote Rwandan democratization before the 1994 genocide.

USAID’s objectives in Rwanda during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were
impacted by clear, discernable political, social, and economic changes. These
changes represent the evolving development ideology of U.S. foreign policy from
modernization theory, to a needs mandate, and later, market liberalization. During
1962, President Kennedy created USAID and Rwanda formally declared
independence. 1973 saw the adoption of the New Directions Mandate months after
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Juvenal Habyarimana led a military coup in Rwanda and took power. During the
1980s, President Reagan placed a new emphasis on the free market and security
interests that coincided with financial crises in Rwanda. Shifts continued into the
1990s.
To understand why these shifts occurred, one must examine trends and
events in Rwanda and the United States between the 1960s and the 1990s. Glenn
Slocum, a former USAID employee, summarized the changing interests of U.S.
foreign aid policies:
The sixties were the time of industrial development, with the rush for
technical assistance development projects. The ‘70s, we were called to help
the developing world to meet basic human needs. The eighties brought a
recognition that we had to pay more attention to the private sector as the
engine of development in most countries. This coincided with a conservative
Republican administration.4
Slocum’s outline demonstrates the reactionary quality of development assistance in
the past, explaining that many of the policies enacted addressed consequences of
earlier programs. Continually correcting unforeseen problems associated with past
policies lends to an appearance of ineffectiveness. Because donor countries fixated
on problems created by their policies instead of the inherent problems within
recipient countries, aid’s effectiveness was limited. By studying the history of
development assistance, policymakers can learn from some of these successes and
failures.
Despite the appearance of inefficient programs, foreign assistance has made
some positive impacts on development. As Hariadene Johnson, a former USAID
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employee explained, USAID programs “really worked in Rwanda and had in many
ways an impact upon the country; a promising future.”5 While this perspective is
useful, it only provides one side of the story. Historical analysis is needed from both
the American and Rwandan perspectives to fully assess the successes and failures of
development aid.
Equally important to a more complete study of development aid in Rwanda is
scholarship independent of the 1994 genocide. Academics that approach Rwandan
history from a linear perspective culminating in the genocide fundamentally
simplify the country’s diverse past. Scholars taking this approach, including Jan
Vansina, Mahmood Mamdani, and Peter Uvin, present a deterministic view of
Rwandan history. The purpose of these academic works is to trace the origins of the
genocide not understand the full breadth of Rwanda’s past. As a result, they often
miss broader implications of their topics. African historian Jan Vansina wrote his
book Antecedents to Modern Rwanda in an effort to correct terms of tribal violence
touted by the media. While his work looks at ancient Rwandan history ending in
1900, his intention centers on better understanding the genocide. Anthropologist
Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers explains how the effects of
colonialism contributed to the growing ethnic violence that led to the genocide. And
political scientist Peter Uvin’s Aiding Violence traces how international development
aid was a factor in the increasing structural violence within Rwanda, eventually
contributing to the genocide. While understanding the roles that these topics played
in the genocide’s formation is crucial and the analysis of the Rwandan genocide is
5
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important, the sole focus on violence simplifies the complexity of Rwanda’s history.
This thesis contributes to the formation of a broader understanding of Rwandan
history.
Though a small, seemingly insignificant country, Rwanda’s history is
important in many rights. New scholarship adding to the incomplete literature on
the history of Rwanda, independent of the genocide, works to reinterpret its image.
Rwanda needs to reclaim its image as a diverse country since the West has used it as
an example, symbol, and warning of the opposite. Initially the “poster child” of
development, Rwanda was touted as the “Switzerland of Africa” by donor nations,
but in the wake of the genocide Rwanda was used as an example of the barbaric
nature of Africans. Other countries are warned to avoid becoming “the next
Rwanda.” This stereotype is perpetuated in the coverage of African conflicts today.
Australian Journalist Dan McDougall’s article “Echoes of Rwanda in Ivory Coast
Killing Fields,” draws connections between the Rwandan genocide and the violence
occurring in the Ivory Coast.6 New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, reporting
on the Libyan civil war commented that “if the Libya operation is successful, it may
help the emerging doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ – a landmark notion in
international law… that might help avert the next Rwanda.”7 This thesis works to
disrupt this simplifying discourse by reinterpreting Rwandan history independent
of the genocide.
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As demonstrated, U.S. foreign policy changed during each decade between
1962 and the 1990s, reflecting political, economic, and social shifts within Rwanda
and America. USAID/Rwanda programs illustrate the United States’ changing
development ideology, but also the dissonant realities of implementing aid ‘on the
ground.’ While development philosophy shifted in the U.S., USAID continued to
implement programs necessary for Rwandan development. These shifts can be
identified and examined through USAID project reports that reveal the reasons
behind new goals and programs. The historical study of development aid is needed
to help contextualize past programs, but also make foreign policy aid more effective
for the future. With too many generalities, development policies become less
efficient. By creating more specific programs with tailored policies to each recipient
country, development aid can become more effective.
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